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Carsharing operators, which rent out electric 
vehicles for minutes or hours, lose money on idle 
vehicles. We develop a model that allows carsharing 
operators to offer the storage of these vehicles on 
operating reserve markets (market for quickly 
rampable back-up power sources that replace for 
instance failing power plants). We consider it a 
dispatch and pricing problem with the tradeoff between 
the payoffs of offering vehicles for rental and selling 
their storage. This is a problem of stochastic nature 
taking into account that people can rent electric 
vehicles at any time. To evaluate our model we tracked 
the location and status of 350 electric vehicles from the 
carsharing company Car2Go and simulated the 
dispatch in the Dutch market. This market needs to be 
redesigned for optimal use of storage. We make 
recommendations for the market redesign and show 
that carsharing operators can make substantial 
additional profits in operating reserve markets. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Carsharing operators, which rent electric vehicles 
for minutes or hours, lose money on idle vehicles. We 
propose a new business model with which they can use 
the storage of these idle electric vehicles (EVs) on 
operating reserve markets to create higher profits. This 
market is a smart market [11, 6, 3], which alleviates 
power imbalances with a dynamic auction based 
mechanism. In this market power sources are traded 
that can serve as an instant back-up when another 
power-source fails (for example when a power plant 
has a defect), or to dump excess electricity (from for 
example too much wind). Carsharing operators can 
participate in this market as a Virtual Power Plant 
(VPP). They pool together several electric vehicles 
from different locations to act as if they were one 
power source that can provide and take back electricity 
according to the market’s need (13, 2). 
We design offers (bids/asks) with respect to price 
and quantity to participate in the tender for operating 
reserves. These offers, which relate to both charging 
and discharging, are determined by taking into account 
the expected revenues that could be earned by making 
an electric vehicle available for rent at specific points 
in time. That has the effect that whenever the market 
accepts (settles) these offers, the carsharing company 
always earns more with them than what they would 
have earned by renting alone. 
To test the effectiveness of our strategy we test it in 
a simulation, which we calibrate with real data as 
suggested by [9, 10]. To validate our finding we need 
data on carsharing electric vehicle transactions and 
their battery status over time and data on the operating 
reserve market tender. We track the location and 
battery status of 350 electric vehicles of their Car2Go 
fleet (www.car2go.com) in real-time over a 14 month 
period. The tender data on the operating reserve 
auction is accessible through the Dutch transmission 
system operator Tennet.  
In our analysis we show that carsharing companies 
can increase their profits by participating in operating 
reserve markets with their electric vehicles as virtual 
power plants. However, we find that under current 
prices in the Netherlands it is not profitable to use 
vehicle-2-grid (discharging the electric vehicles to 
provide electricity to the grid). The increased revenues 
come from charging the electric vehicles with excess 
electricity from the grid. For example when wind parks 
produce too much electricity for the grid to handle, 
they pay the electric vehicles to absorb the excess 
electricity.  Therefore the carsharing operator saves 
money on charging the electric vehicles in the first 
place, plus the payment to take on excess electricity. 
This means that the carsharing operator needs to be 
more flexible over time on when to charge the electric 
vehicles but we show that this does not significantly 
affect rental operations.   
The strategy that our model prescribes is 
sustainable as it helps to balance volatile renewable 
energy sources. As the demand for renewable energy is 
increasing in many parts of the world there will also be 
a higher need for operating reserve power, which we 
can partially deliver with electric vehicles. With an 
increased demand also vehicle-2-grid may be 
economically worthwhile. With the strategy that our 
model prescribes, we create an incentive for people and 
business to behave sustainably, which is "an 
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opportunity to create shared value -- that is, a 
meaningful benefit for society that is also valuable to 
the business" [13]. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we will 
describe the background of our work on how the 
operating reserve market works and present the 
literature that our model builds on. Second, we explain 
the details of our model. After we have outlined the 
model we go in on the data and will illustrate how we 
use the data to evaluate the model. Next, we will 
analyze our findings. Finally we will conclude our 
work including an outlook on future research. 
 
2. Background and related work  
 
In this section we will first provide a background of 
the market functioning of operating reserves. We will 
also make recommendations on how this market should 
be adapted in the future to be suitable for storage. 
Afterwards, we will describe the literature on the field 
of smart charging and vehicle-2-grid with electric 
vehicles, what has been done already, and how our 
research extends what has been done so far.  
 
2.1. Operating reserve market design 
  
The operating reserve market is an auction which is 
usually administered by the transmission system 
operator. This market guarantees to keep the grid in 
balance at all times by avoiding over or 
underproduction of electricity which would result in 
blackouts. To participate in this market participating 
parties have to show that their resources can ramp up 
to full production capacity within 30 seconds so that it 
can react quickly when there is over or under 
production. The tender for this auction is done on a 
weekly basis where parties can submit their offers for 
the upcoming week. They can submit asks if they want 
to sell electricity and they can submit bids if they want 
to buy electricity. Once their bids and asks are 
submitted the units need to be available (reserved) at 
all times for which they are compensated with a 
capacity fee. The market operator decides based on 
demand and supply whether to the offered asks or bids 
are executed. The executed bids and asks are paid the 
respective price that they submitted with their offers 
and are settled in merit order (cheapest resources are 
used first). The clearing mechanism functions as a 
“pay-as-bid” auction. Figure 1 illustrates the market 
clearing mechanism. In this example the market needs 
to get rid of clearing quantity Q*=1,100 MWh. All 
participating bids are sorted in merit order so that bids 
1, 5, 16, and 3 (partially) are settled. This means that 
they have to use the quantity specified in their bids and 
are paid their submitted price. Note that there is a 1 
MWh minimum lot size on this market, which we will 
disregard as in reality one would just need larger fleets. 
 
 
8.1.1. Recommended changes to market design. 
Current regulations reflect a market that is 
characterized by fossil fuel based resources. In 
theoretically extreme cases it could ask participating 
parties to deliver electricity for the whole week.  This 
would require very large batteries that would never be 
used to their full capacity. We therefore recommend 
and will proceed as if the market would allow bids for 
time intervals with 15 minute increments. This allows 
also storage to participate in this market and is in line 
with recommendations by a study commissioned by a 
consortium of Dutch and German transmission system 
operators [1]. 
 
2.2. Operating reserves from electric vehicles 
  
Previous research has already studied smart 
charging. In smart charging electric vehicle owners get 
financial incentives to shift charging times to less 
congested hours.  Fridgen et al. [5] and Valogianni et 
al. [19] have shown that this reduces peaks in the grid. 
Other studies have also studied the vehicle-2-grid 
concept. Its efficiency has been validated by an 
information system in a micro grid context [4]. Given 
the departure times of EVs parked at public charging 
stations other authors [8] show a reduction in the 
monthly energy bill of 24.8%. A similar setting was 
also researched by Vytelingum et al. [20] who find a 
utility bill reduction of 14% for households that use a 
 
Figure 1. Multi-unit pay-as-bid auction. All bids to 
the left of Q* (bid 1, 5, 16, and partially 3) are 
cleared at their respective prices (50, 100, 120, 




battery exposed to dynamic pricing at the energy 
wholesale market. Other studies that consider electric 
vehicles estimate the annual profits per vehicle to be 
$10-120 [12], $176-203 [17], and $415-826 [15]. 
However, none of these studies use data from electric 
vehicles or take uncertainty about driving behavior into 
account. Tomic and Kempton [18] show that vehicle-2-
grid can be profitable with a real fleet of hybrid electric 
vehicles. However, this study assumes that the time 
and distance of the trips made with these electric 
vehicles are known perfectly in advance. A 
shortcoming of the existing studies is that they assume 
trips are assumed to be known in advance. This does 
not always hold in reality and is problematic when an 
electric vehicle is committed to either charge or to do 
vehicle-2-grid at the same time as someone needs to 
drive it. We will describe our model, which builds on 
[7] in the next section, does not make strong 
assumptions on driving patterns and is therefore 
applicable in practice in contrast to previous studies. 
 
3. Model Description  
 
We submit offers to the operating reserve auction 
that reflect the underlying valuations of the carsharing 
company. These offers include the (opportunity) cost 
for the operator to commit electric vehicles to the 
market. The model makes decisions about how much 
storage should be offered (Q) and at what price (P). 
The quantity and price can be different per 15 minute 
time interval to reflect the different expected profits 
from rental transactions which changes over the course 
of a day/week. Our model determines quantities and 
prices for both discharging and charging for each time 
interval and submits them to the market.  Based on the 
merit order the market decides whether and to what 
degree he wants to make use of these offers. If the 
market decides it wants to use these offers for a certain 
15 minute time interval we need to provide and absorb 
the requested quantity up to the maximum of the full 
offered quantity Q. For that purpose we have to 
allocate specific electric vehicles. If these electric 
vehicles are available everything is fine. However, if 
we observe in the data that during this process a 
customer rented one of those electric vehicles, we can 
create a virtual power plant. A virtual power plant 
means that it does not matter to the market which 
electric vehicle to deploy as long as we deliver the 
committed quantity. That is if another idle electric 
vehicle is available and connected to the grid we can 
replace the rented one with the other idle electric 
vehicle and still live up to our commitment and rent 
out an electric vehicle. We are dealing with 
asymmetric payoffs in this case. While renting out an 
electric vehicle earns around $15 of profits on average, 
storage only earns $0.05 on average. But under no 
circumstances can we go back on our commitment to 
the operating reserve market because this would lead to 
high penalties (ACM Framework Agreement Art. 7, 
Par. 3). We therefore have to adapt our models to 
reflect these asymmetric payoffs. Whenever we do 
commit units to the operating reserve market we need 
to be very certain that these electric vehicles will not 
be rented out. Therefore we apply a sampling method 
that is proportional to the payoffs more likely to select 
training cases where electric vehicles are rented. In 
other words the proportion of rental:NoRental cases in 
the training data set is sampled 300:1 ($15/$0.05). In 
general we apply a two month training data set to learn 
about the availability of vehicles and the prices we 
should charge and evaluate it over one test week (the 
tender period). We chose two month because we had 
14 month of data and could then test our strategy over 
a whole year. In the following we will describe in more 
detail how exactly we determine the offer quantities 
(Q) and then we will describe how we will price (P) 
these quantities. 
 
3.1. Offer quantity composition 
  
We need to know how much idle capacity for both 
charging and discharging the entire fleet has at any 
future time. We consider only electric vehicles parked 
at charging stations for this. This is the quantity that we 
want to submit to the operating reserve market. We use 
the machine learning algorithms neural networks, 
random forest, and support vector machines to predict 
the storage available for charging (Q
charge
) and the 
storage available to discharge (Q
discharge
). The quantity 
needs to be known up to one week in advance already 
because that is when the tender closes for the following 
week. The quantities are discounted by a charging and 
discharging efficiency of 96% and 97.4% respectively 
[16]. The underlying logic and therefore model is the 
same for charging and discharging, as it depends on the 
day of the week, the hour of the day, and the lagged 
dependent variable (based on the availability in the 
weeks before at the same day and time): 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘(t) 
+𝛽2 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑦(t) 
+𝛽3 ∗ 𝑦𝑡−1..9 
(Equation 1) 
 




 depending on 
which variable one wants to forecast; the underlying 
model is the same. 
A random forest model with 2 randomly 
preselected variables, 1000 randomized trees, and a 
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minimum sum of weights for splitting of 5 was the 







3.2. Offer price composition 
  
Besides the offer quantities, we also have to 
determine what price we would like to get for these 
offers. We will consider ask prices (P
discharge
) and bid 
prices (P
charge
) separately as they have different cost 
structures. 
 
3.2.1. Ask (discharging) price. We construct the ask 
price by taking into account the cost that the carsharing 
operator incurs from the electricity tariff (one has to 
charge the battery before one can discharge it), the 
battery depreciation cost, the expected rental profits, 




𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 = 𝐸𝑇 + 𝐷 +  𝜋?̂? + 𝜇𝑡 (Equation 2) 
 
where ET is the industrial electricity tariff that the 
carsharing company is eligible for (ET=0.1
$
kWh
 in the 




π̂ is the expected rental profits (also determined with a 
random forest model from Equation 1 through the day 
of the week, the hour of the day, and lagged dependent 
variables), and μ is a profit margin which is determined 
by optimizing it over the two month training period to 
maximize gross profits. 
 
3.2.2. Bid (charging) price. We construct the bid price 
by taking into account the opportunity cost of not 
having to charge the electric vehicles at the industrial 
electricity tariff, the expected rental profits, plus a 
margin to make a profit in a “pay-as-bid” market.  
 
𝑃𝑡
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 = −𝐸𝑇 +  𝜋?̂? + 𝜇𝑡 (Equation 3) 
 
where ET is the industrial electricity tariff of the 
carsharing company,  π̂ is the expected rental profit 
(also determined with a random forest model from 
Equation 1 through the day of the week, the hour of the 
day, and lagged dependent variables), and μ is a profit 
margin which is optimized over the training period for 
the highest payoff. 
 
4. Data  
 
We run a simulation which we calibrate with real 
world data on operating reserve tenders and carsharing 
electric vehicle usage. Our simulation comes very 
close to an actual field study except for the one case 
when the model decided to commit the storage of a car 
to the market, while in reality someone has rented this 
car which is mutually exclusive. We do account for the 
reduced revenues but we cannot account for the minor 
difference that after the rental the car in the dataset is 
located where the customer dropped it off after rental, 
while in the simulation we assume that the rental did 
not happen. However, this does not have an impact on 
the overall results because we will show that we rarely 
have to forego rental customers and location does not 
have a direct effect on the ability to offer reserve 
capacity on average. 
 
4.1. Operating reserve auction data 
  
The tender data, including the individual bids and 
market clearing quantities, for the Dutch operating 
reserve market are published daily by the Transmission 
System operator Tennet on its website. We use this 
data to reconstruct the merit order curve and the market 
clearing quantity Q* both to absorb excess electricity 
and to provide additional electricity. In these merit 
order curves we insert additional bids and asks from 
the virtual power plant of electric vehicles of Car2Go. 
Then we clear the market according to the market 
clearing mechanism as described in Section 2.1. Figure 
2 illustrates the average operating reserve balancing 
prices over the course of a day in the period June 2014 
– June 2015. The grey line shows the highest average 
market price for charging in that period and how it 
changes every 15 minute interval. The black line shows 
the highest market clearing price that one would get for 
discharging an electric vehicle for every 15 minute 
interval. In general the market price for discharging is 
much higher than the price for charging because it 
needs to be generated. Note also the high standard 
deviations as indicated by the bars, which show that at 
times prices can be significantly higher than the 
average price. For simplicity we did not account for 
capacity prices making our results more conservative. 
 
4.2. Electric vehicle usage data 
  
Daimler provided us with data from their 
carsharing subsidiary Car2Go on Electric Vehicles in 
Amsterdam. Car2Go is a free floating carsharing 
business that rents electric vehicles to customers for 
very short amounts of time (minutes, hours). 
Customers can pick up any of the cars and rent them. 
After they have finished the rental they can to return it 
to any public parking spot within the defined operating 




a minute basis plus a distance surcharge when it 
exceeds a 50 km threshold. The data that we get 
includes information about an ID of the electric 
vehicle, the state of charge in %, the latitude, the 
longitude, the interior status (good/bad), the exterior 
status (good/bad), the street, the zip code, the city, and 
whether the car is currently charging or not. This 
information is available to us in real time. We 
download this data every 5 minutes and add a 
timestamp (date and time) to the data for the 14 month 
period March 1
st
 2014 – June 29th 2015. The data 
contains entries for parked vehicles only. However, 
based on the information of how long the electric 
vehicle is missing and the change in battery status we 
can infer the rental revenues based on an average fuel 
usage quite accurately. We calculate the rental tariff 
per minute times the duration plus the tariff per km 




In this section we are mainly concerned with the 
economic evaluation of using electric vehicles in 
virtual power plants for carsharing operators. We will 
illustrate how economical this is with the example of 
Amsterdam. First, we will analyze the decision making 
of our model and how this influences the profitability 
of Car2Go. Then we will consider seasonal patterns in 
carsharing and in the profitability of virtual power 
plants. Finally, we will put the output of the virtual 
power plant in perspective to the larger requirement for 





5.1. Decision accuracy and profits 
  
The elaborate decisions that our model does for 
each individual 15 minute time slot over the period of a 
year in terms of prices and quantities to sell and buy 
electricity are settled in the market and executed 
accordingly. We have analyzed these decisions in 
terms of their costs and revenues for Car2Go in 
Amsterdam. Overall we can represent this as a 
classification problem. We have the choice to either 
commit the storage on the operating reserve market or 
not (equivalent to making it available for rental). Table 
2 shows the confusion matrix with the aggregated 
profits of the choices we faced during the whole year. 
In the case that our model predicted that electric 
vehicles should not be committed to the operating 
reserve market it was right quite often and earned 
$1178,000 gross profits from the rentals (true 
negatives). In many cases this decision was also wrong 
but this is not as problematic, because we did not do 
anything with idle cars, which happens currently with 
all idle electric vehicles (false negatives). In case that 
the model predicted that it would be most profitable to 
make a virtual power plant, while it would have been 
even more profitable to rent that vehicle we lost $400 
gross profits in opportunity cost compared to only the 
rental business model (false positives). However, the 
additional profits from the operating reserve market 
when it was also most profitable to commit to the 
operating reserve market make up for this by earning 
an additional $17.000 gross profits annually (true 
positives). Overall this means that by engaging in 
virtual power plants on the operating reserve market, 
electric vehicle carsharing owners can gain an 
additional $16.600 gross profits, which is a 1.4%  
 
 




increase in gross profits. This number may appear low, 
but we did not take into account fixed costs of vehicles.  
 
5.2. Seasonal variation 
  
The data indicates that there is a seasonal variation 
in the rental data. Specifically, carsharing services are 
used more frequently in winter months in Amsterdam 
(in hotter regions it may be the summer months due to 
air conditioning in cars). Figure 3 shows how the gross 
profits develop over the year (black line). One can see 
clear spikes from December – March, while it is at a 
lower level between April – November. The erratic 
behavior also within the seasons may be explainable by 
weather differences within this period, which we leave 
open for future research. The profits from the virtual 
power plants (grey line) do not seem to follow a 
seasonal pattern. However, the profits with virtual 
power plants are consistently higher than the profits 
from rental only. We conclude that our model performs 
well and profits are evenly distributed over the seasons. 
 
5.2. Contribution to operating reserve market 
  
Our model is not only profitable for carsharing 
operators, but it also increases the competition on 
operating reserve markets. Specifically, the electric 
vehicles offer a lucrative way for market operators to 
dump their excess electricity. This is especially 
relevant for increasing shares of renewable energy 
sources in the future. Figure 4 shows that the market 
never settled asks to discharge electricity and during 
the whole year not a single MWh was discharged, 
which is evident from the flat grey line. However, the 
electric vehicles contributed significantly to the market 
for excess electricity, which is consistent across the 
year. We see that mid 2014 there was a much higher 
need for storage from electric vehicles than in the 
beginning of 2015. This is due to a general decrease in 
the market price in this period (from 11 $/MWh to 
6$/MWh), which makes it less likely that our bids fall 
within the equilibrium quantities (Q*). 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
We have shown that electric vehicle carsharing 
companies can enhance their profits by selling the 
storage of their idle electric vehicles on markets for 
back-up power (operating reserve markets). Compared 
to previous research we did not make strong 
assumptions on driving patterns that are known in 
advance and show that even with stochastic driving 
patterns it increases profits. With current back-up 
power market prices, battery depreciation cost, and 
charging infrastructure carsharing companies can earn 
most additional profits by charging their electric 
vehicles at times when the grid needs to get rid of 
excess electricity. Even though some rental profits are 
forgone in this way this is compensated by far from 
savings on cost for charging and they get an additional 
payment for this grid service. Our model can already 
be implemented with the currently available 
technology in Amsterdam and is ready for a practice 
Table 2. The confusion matrix shows how 
profitable the decisions of our model are. The 
added value from virtual power plants (VPP) 
exceeds the losses from foregone rentals by far. 
  Predicted 
  VPP Rented 
Actual 
VPP +$17,000 - 
Rented -$400 $1178,000 
  
  
Figure 3. Shows the profit over the year. The Winter 
period is a driving factor for rentals in Amsterdam. 
The profits from offering virtual power plant power 
on the real-time market increases the gross profits 
of Car2Go consistently. 
Figure 4. Shows the virtual power plant output over 
the year. It is striking that throughout the year 
much energy from the real-time market is used to 
charge the vehicles, while discharging vehicle-2o 
grid (V2G) does not occur only sporadically.  3090
  
trial. We find that vehicle-2-grid is less economically 
sound under current circumstances, which may, 
however, change with increasing shares of renewable 
energy sources and decreasing battery cost. It would 
also require bidirectional charging poles which are not 
yet widely available. 
For future research we are interested in an 
international comparison. The Netherlands have 
relatively low operating reserve market prices due to a 
minor share of renewable energy sources of the total 
electricity mix. It would be interesting to compare the 
Dutch case to Germany or California, which have a 
higher share of renewable energy sources. Another 
way to increase the accuracy of our model is to take the 
limits of distribution systems into account. In contrast 
to conventional power plants electric vehicles are much 
better distributed over the city and can alleviate the 
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